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Introduction
The palm oil industry has been, and is likely to remain, an important
engine of growth for the Malaysian agricultural sector and economy. In
year 2000, the industry contributed RM14.93 billion of export earnings
and about 26% oftotal world edible oil and fats trade (Balasubramaniam,
2001). Based on the forecast made by the Third National Agricultural
Policy (NAP3), the hectarage cultivated is expected to reach 3.6 million
hectares in year 2010, palm oil production and exports to increase to
11.7 and 9.6 million tonnes, respectively. This optimism is based on the
broad assumptions that the expansion in hectarage will be accompanied
by improvement in productivity which includes yield of fresh fruit
bunches (FFB) per hectare as well as oil extraction rates.
One of the main characteristics of the Malaysian palm oil industry is
its long agro-processing chain consisting of five distinct subsectors,
namely oil palm cultivation, palm oil milling, refining and the
manufacture of oleochemicals for downstream consumer products.
Various associations care for the welfare ofthe subsectors. The Malaysian
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Palm Oil Councilor MPOC (plantation), Malaysian Edible Oil Manu-
facturer's Association (millers) and the Palm Oil Refiners' Association
of Malaysia (PORAM) are examples of the strong associations, which
back their group interests. Despite the dominance of the Permodalan
Nasional Berhad (PNB)-owned corporations in the plantation sector,
downstream integration by the PNB group is limited generally to the
milling stage. Thus, the subsectors along the vertical chain have to com-
pete aggressively among themselves for a greater share of the industry's
profits. The ability of the Associations to influence government policies
will certainly lead to regulations that favour their course. On the other
hand, the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) represents the key public
agency responsible for the overall development of the industry.
At the global scenario, Indonesia is the only credible competitor to
Malaysian palm oil exports while, in the consumers' market, soybean
oil is the main substitute. The ASEAN financial melt down in 1997, and
the political unrest that followed, has weakened Indonesia's threat to
some extent.
Theoretical Framework
Government policies and regulations are generally purposive and goal-
oriented. These can be specific or broad to cover industry or national
issues. The identification ofproblems ofpublic concern, be it economic,
social, or political triggers the policy formulation process. This involves
a clear statement of the objective(s) to be met and the consequent acts of
policy adoption, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation ofthe course
of actions taken.
In the case of primary commodities, government policies are often
intended to correct market failures as well as equity imbalances among
stakeholders, so as to enhance market performance and societal welfare.
Generally, a dichotomy exists in assessing market performance between
economic and management studies for which policy issues and
prescriptions are sought. The former tends to emphasize market
competitiveness while the latter on firm and industry profitability.
In the 1960's, most economic research on market competitiveness
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focuses on the industrial organization framework. Bain's (1968) seminal
work on the market structure-conduct-performance paradigm provided
the basis for much of the documented empirical work in this direction
(Clarke, 1985, Ishak, 1994). Studies on the efficiency of information
flow or price transmission were also popular, again to capture market
imperfections (Granger, 1969, Fama, 1970, Gupta, 1982). These include
lead and lag price structures, causal and asymmetric price relationships,
market integration and so forth.
Another area that was popular among economists was on cost
minimization strategies addressing issues on resource allocation and
productive efficiency including applications of spatial programming
models to minimize shipment costs (Bressler, 1970, Nik, 1976). The
underlying rationale is that minimization ofunit costs ofproduction and
distribution improves the competitiveness of the products sold, thus
enhancing profits.
Whilst economists tend to focus on cost minimization solutions and
market imperfections, the management approach in industry analysis
begins from the firm perspective. The firm evaluates its strength -
weakness - opportunities - threats (SWOT analysis) in rationalizing its
strategic plan with the intention ofachieving superior profits than before,
or at least equal to the industry average. In recent years, the SWOT
framework has been extended to cover industry and sector evaluation
and in the formulation ofpolicies and strategic directions. This approach
was adopted in the formulation ofMalaysia's Third National Agricultural
Policy (NAP3).
An extension made to the SWOT analysis is the Porter's Framework
(1979, 1994), which identified five forces that he claimed must be
evaluated in the formulation of a strategic plan. These forces are the
degree ofrivalry among competitors, threat ofnew entry and substitutes,
and the bargaining power of buyers and sellers. Porter further claimed,
"Most issues in strategy are the same for domestic and global companies"
(Porter, 1994, pg.l 09).
Because of the overwhelming popularity of Porter's approach, other
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management 'gurus' have developed other considerations or theories in
order to add more meat to Porter's industry analysis. These include Collis
and Ghemawat (1994) who incorporate some dynamics to the approach;
Narayanan and Fahey (1994) on how environmental analysis affects firm
decisions and profitability; and that of linking social and political
environment to corporate strategy (Mahon, Bigelow and Fahey, 1994).
New Wealth Creating Strategy (NWCS)
Admittedly, Porter's and related paradigms are useful in industry
analysis and strategic planning but to say the same principles apply to
domestic and international rivalry is rather simplistic and presumptuous.
This is where our philosophy in determining policy directions and in
strategising efforts to maximise profits for the palm oil industry differs
from that of Porter.
The new approach requires a change in mindset or a paradigm shift.
Its focus is on national rather than the firm perspective. The New Wealth
Creating Strategy requires firms and government to work closely with
each other, with the expectation that the synergy in effort can generate
higher levels of profitability and wealth for the firms and the country
respectively, than if firms operate independently and in rivalry. Here,
national interest prevails over private or individual interest without
compromising profit levels. In the case of Malaysia's palm oil industry,
this collaboration is made easier as the government, through equity held
by the PNB, indirectly owns most of the big companies. The rationale
behind our approach is based on the premises that: -
a. The palm oil industry is of strategic interest to the economy and
about 88.7 per cent of market competition (proportion of total
output) is in the international arena and not the domestic market.
b. The global market represents a large enough cake for everyone;
unlike domestic markets that are typically limited in size and
firms have to compete aggressively to gain a greater share of
profits or for survival.
c. Strategic alliances among firms and government can ensure that
all systems (i.e. policies, strategies and actions of stakeholders)
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move in the same direction (for national interest) so that Malay-
sia's dominance in the global palm oil market can be built from
strength to strength over time, and enhance her comparative ad-
vantage over product and competitor threats.
d. There will be considerable savings in firm and government
resources ifcommon activities such as research and development
expenditures, information gathering, promotion and trading can
be streamlined and responsibilities shared. Cross-fertilisation of
ideas, information, research findings, and experience all work
towards better performance in the industry.
What is advocated here is that stakeholders including government
agencies operate as a team so as to give them strength and comparative
advantage over foreign competitors. Government assistance in
international marketing can provide firms easier and speedier linkage to
foreign markets and in assuring that contracts are honoured than if firms
were to venture on their own. Also, this amalgamation of forces will
improve the industry's resilience in meeting challenges from increasingly
competitive market conditions arising from e-commerce and borderless
trade.
The application of NWCS requires us to define our primary
development objective, either in broad terms (e.g. maximisation of
national wealth) or measurable terms (e.g. targeted foreign exchange
earnings), and other anchor or supportive objectives to achieve the former.
Within each anchor objective, we nest the strategies or action plans we
need to adopt, recognising that these actions may also have positive or
negative effects on other supportive objectives.
The identification and adoption ofgood strategies and action plans is
complicated and often clouded by institutional rivalries and influences
of vested interest groups, especially by those who dominate and
orchestrate the industry. Thus, in search for effective strategic directions
and action plans, compromises and sacrifices have to be made among
key industry players for sake of national interest and the benefit of all
stakeholders in the long run.
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With transparent policies as well as a cooperative business environ-
ment, the NWCS will send clear signals of the expected roles of
stakeholders and government agencies in order to meet national
aspirations. Thus, in search ofpolicy directions for the palm oil industry,
we pay special attention to collaborative behaviour, instead ofone that is
traditionally based on firm rivalry and greed.
Evaluation of Present Objectives
The Malaysian government's policy objectives and strategies for the
palm oil industry are embodied in the Third National Agricultural Plan
(NAP3) and the Second Industrial Master plan (IMP2). We will attempt
to evaluate these and see if the efforts taken are synergistic and conducive
for the creation of national wealth.
The mission statement or ultimate goal for the palm oil industry, as
stipulated by both the NAP3 and IMP2, is that the palm oil sector should
enable Malaysia to develop into: -
* An International Centre for Oils and Fats
In order to achieve this, the supporting development objectives (NAP3)
are: -
1. To ensure sustainable supply of raw material for the continuous
development of the palm oil industry, especially in the
downstream value-added sector,
H. To further enhance Malaysia's position as a centre of excellence
for R&D and technology in palm oil and palm oil products,
HI. To position Malaysia as an international oils and fats centre, and
IV. To enhance contribution to revenue and growth for the o"erall
economy.
With Malaysia's universal reputation for quality palm oil production
and her competitive edge over other oils as well as her dominance in the
world palm oil trade, the mission statement is achievable. The issue is
the duration it will take to achieve this position but, even then, there is
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no guarantee that we will be maximising national earnings from palm oil
products.
Skipping objective (i) for the moment, we find that objective (ii) is
important as better technology contributes to the competitiveness of our
palm oil exports in the global market. Objective (iii) is similar to the
mission statement and is therefore redundant. As for objective (iv), the
causal link to the mission statement, as mentioned earlier, may not be
necessarily true.
Objective (i) requires some deliberation as both the IMP2 and NAP3
stress on the need to ensure adequate and sustainable supply of raw
material for continued downstream development ofthe industry. As with
other previous development plans, this fear oflack of raw materials was
mooted due to the existence of excess capacity in the milling, refining,
and oleochemical industries (PORLAAnnual Reports), which is assumed
to limit the availability of raw materials for downstream activities. In
other words, excess capacity has been equated with inefficiency in the
milling, refining and oleochemical manufacturing sub-sectors, thus
stifling their growth.
Evaluation of Strategies Adopted
Thus to ensure adequate and sustainable supply of raw material for
downstream value added activities, the main strategies adopted by NAP3
were:
(a) Prevent new entry by freezing licenses or by imposing highly
restrictive entry conditions (e.g. any new refinery license is only
for refining other oils except palm oil),
(b) Impose high export taxes on crude palm oil (CPO), and
(c) Promote offshore investments.
Although on paper the value-added theme appears a logical and se-
quential development process for the sector, the adoption of the above
strategies created serious structural problems to the industry. The freez-
ing of licenses led to high market concentration and foreign ownership
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in downstream activities, especially in the refining sub-sector. Here, the
market concentration for the top 8 firms was reported to be 79% (Table
1) as against 54 % in the 1980's, with foreign and non-Bumiputra
ownerships at 57% and 28% respectively. This distribution ofownership
is lop-sided as the PNB group of companies owned more than 70% of
the plantations and yet owned less than 10% of the refineries, in terms of
both number and capacity.
With about 10% of palm oil products being exported through local
shippers, this meant that the marketing infrastructure, from refining to
shipping of palm oil products, was dominated by foreign participants.
Needless to say, the ability of these firms to artificially depress CPO
Table 1: Malaysian Palm Oil Industry: Concentration Ratio
(4 and 8 Firms) by Sub-sector, 1998
Sub-sector 4 Firms 8 Firms
Plantation
Mill
Refinery
Oleochemical
32.7
39.6
61.0
63.5
40.0
49.8
79.0
87.4
prices will enhance their profits; all of which are at the expense of pri-
mary producers and national wealth generation. Market indicators of
the lucrative profits that are enjoyed by refiners were expansion in refin-
ing capacities, full capacity operation ofplants, stickiness in retail cook-
ing oil prices relative to falls in CPO prices, and their ability to acquire
public-listed companies that were caught by the ASEAN financial crisis.
An example ofthe massive profits ofdownstream players was the recent
acquisition oftwo public-listed companies (Pantai and Tongkah Holdings)
by a newly listed palm oil processing company (Paos Holdings).
The imposition of high taxes on a progressive scale on CPO exports
(Table 2) further favoured downstream players, again at the expense of
primary producers. With the present production cost of CPO at around
RM800/ton, the tax structure creates an absurd situation in which ex-
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ports of processed palm oil (PPO) are cheaper than CPO. For CPO
prices ofRM700/ton and above, the processing cost per ton CPO (about
RM50/ton) is lower than the export tax (RM 70/ton), thus forcing CPO
producers to sell in the domestic market.
In a buyers' market, it is not surprising that CPO prices were sup-
pressed and transacted for sometime below the cost of production. For
the first six months of200l, the average price ofCPO was only RM 750/
ton. With a loss of RM 50/ton and production level close to a million
Table 2: CPO Prices and Export Tariffs (%)
CPO Prices
On 1st RM650/ton
Plus on the next RM50/ton
Plus on the next RM50/ton
Plus on the next RM50/ton
Plus on the next RM50/ton
Plus on the balance
Tariff Rate %
o
10
15
20
25
30
tons per month, palm oil plantations incurred a massive loss of about
RM 50 million per month. On the other hand, and based on retail cooking
oil prices at RM 21kg, refiners were making a whopping profit of about
RM 1 billion per month- what a loss to the national economy!
Following the strategic directions of NAP3, reverse investment in
plantations were actively pursued in Indonesia and Philippines, in
particular, by the PNB Plantation-based Corporations. In Indonesia alone
the exposure was about RM8.42 billion, consisting of new investments
in plantations (RM3.87 billion) and acquisitions ofauctioned plantations
(RM4.55 billion), excluding Gutheries' recent acquisition ofindonesia's
Salim Group for RM 1.3 billion.
Despite expectations of cheap labour and low operational cost, most
of the Malaysian companies incurred heavy losses and are presently
struggling to salvage their investments. In the Philippines, one prominent
company wound up its operation while the existence of another is
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symbolic. Experiences in Kalimantan and Sumatra, Indonesia, too were
far adrift of expectations. Government inefficiencies, corruption, thefts
in both office equipment and oil palm fruits, uncertain tenure
arrangements, excessive employment demands on estates, security
problems and expenses on "social obligations" constitute the large "hidden
costs" Malaysian companies had to bear.
Reverse investment in plantations. is a clear case of a strategy that
was not thoroughly evaluated. If such investments were made locally
especially in East Malaysia, the Malaysian economy would have benefited
substantially, through strengthening her position as the dominant supplier
for world palm oil as well as gaining, directly and indirectly, from the
multiplier effects arising out of the economic activities generated from
the business.
Discussion
From the above discussion, it is apparent that extreme caution must
be exercised in rationalising policy objectives and directions for an
industry, as these can lead to the formulation of strategies that are
detrimental to overall development of the industry itself and to national
wealth creation. In the case ofthe Malaysian palm oil industry, ignorance
of the term 'excess capacity' among policy makers led to poor licensing
and fiscal policies, the dominance of foreign firms downstream, and
financial losses in offshore investments. These ills were eventually shown
in form of reduced profits or losses in the annual accounts of primary
producers, including the PNB corporations (Golden Hope, 2000, Guthries,
2000, Sime Darby,2000).
Excess capacity for all intent and purpose is a norm rather than an
anomaly for most industries. Motives for excess capacity are many and
these could be due to anticipated growth in market demand or even to
pose a threat to new entry. In the case ofWest Coast fisheries, the problem
of excess capacity (too many boats catching limited stocks of fish) has
been in existence for decades (Ishak, 1994). However, the Malaysian
government does not impose a ban or high tariffs on fish exports in order
to solve the problem. Obviously, these steps will not work but instead
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create new problems, which penalise innocent fish exporters for poor
decisions made by the boat owners.
A similar situation prevails in the palm oil industry. The existence of
excess capacity in the industry could be due to bad investment decisions
by some stakeholders in relation to the anticipated market demand, or
even fictitious as refiners were making exorbitant profits. High tariffs on
CPO and palm kernel oil (PKO) exports and the promotion of offshore
investments in oil palm plantations (NAP3 and IMP2) in order to ensure
an adequate supply ofraw materials to refineries and oleochemical plants
will not solve the problem of over capitalisation. It only compounds the
problem as investments are trapped in foreign land which is in turmoil.
In the former situation, it means that producers are pressured to sell
their products in the domestic market because of the export duty, thus
subsidising operators of refineries and oleochemical plants who had the
global world market at their disposal. Furthermore, the perpetual surpluses
of palm oil in the industry's physical inventories and those held by
companies in their plantations clearly indicate that the raw material is
plentiful. As the leading supplier of palm oil to the world market and
with domestic consumption at about 11.3 %, it is ironical that ensuring
adequate supply of raw materials is a policy objective. As such, reported
surpluses of the raw material will obviously depress palm oil prices and
national earnings.
When priorities are not in place, issues not properly identified, and
problems not clearly understood, policy prescriptions often run conflict
with each other. Another example is the recent fixing ofminimum wages
to the estate sector. Without due consideration ofthe target groups (foreign
and local labour) to benefit or the cost of labour in plantation operations,
the policy will be counterproductive to efforts in increasing labour
productivity. There is a dire need for issues or problems to be thoroughly
investigated before effective policies can be crystallised, otherwise policy
prescriptions will misguide public and private investors, penalise inno-
cent parties, and result in a misallocation of national resources.
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Using the NWCS as a guide, and recognising the liberalisation of
trade under AFTA, AlA and WTO, national development policies for the
palm oil industry must be proactive, outward looking, coherent and, more
importantly, unbiased to all stakeholders in order to inculcate cooperative
behaviour. Also, the policies must be clearly understood by all
stakeholders so that they can play their expected roles to meet national
aspirations, besides providing good service to global buyers so as to gain
market confidence for the products that we sell. With these considerations
in mind, we propose the national objective or mission statement for the
palm oil industry as: "to enhance contribution to foreign exchange
earnings and growth for the overall economy" while the anchor objectives
are as follows: -
1. To create a friendly and transparent business environment, locally
and internationally, for enhancing market confidence and
sustainable development of the palm oil industry,
2. To enhance the competitiveness of Malaysian palm oil in the
global oils and fats market,
3. To encourage the development and growth ofdownstream value-
added activities,
4. To augment Malaysia's position as the world's centre of
excellence for R&D and technology development in palm oil
and palm oil products, and
5. To develop Malaysia as an international oils and fats centre.
To augment each of the anchor objectives, we need to nest the
appropriate strategies or action plans to adopt. Here, institutions play an
important role in the formulation of appropriate action plans as well as
in the development of regulations, practices, and relationships that
emphasize transparency, trust, cooperation, and accountability. In these
respects, we suggest the rationalisation of industry agencies to just two
globally oriented institutions
(a) MPOB to represent the government sector, and
(b) MPOC to represent the private sector,
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two core umbrellas for the industry, whereby all other public and private
agencies or associations can channel their views so that debates and
resolutions are made in the context ofnational rather than group interest.
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